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Problem
• Repression comprises acts of violations of physical integrity rights by state-sponsored actors
• Over the last century, state repression has caused six times as many fatalities as all international
wars and civil conflicts taken together
• The literature agrees that democracy is associated with lower repression
• However, the effect of a regime change towards democracy is unclear, because regime changes
can go in hand with civil unrest.
Theory
• We assume that the welfare of individuals is influenced by both economic and political factors
• The objective of the government is to remain in power. To this aim, it can use repression.
• In principle, democracy can affect government repression in two directions:
Motivation Opportunity⤷ Democratic government represents wider 
spectre of societal groups⤷ Better representation of preferences⤷ Less aggregate dissatisfaction⤷ Fewer violent opponents
⤷ Under democracy, opposition has more 
freedom to organize than under autocracy⤷ Violent opponents more effective 
under democracy⤷ Government faces greater threat
à Democratizations reduce repression à Democratizations increase repression
• Using a mathematical model, we predict that income acts as a moderating variable
• Civil unrest is more closely linked to economic factors in democracies than in autocracies
• Hence, higher wealth of the population requires democratic governments to use less repression
Hypothesis: Democratizations are more likely to reduce repression in countries with high income 
levels and more likely to increase repression in low-income countries.
Data
Jonathan Old, Department of Economics and GRI
Research in collaboration with Martin Rößler and Patrick Zwerschke, TU Dresden, Germany
Conclusions
• We use ”Human Rights Scores” from Fariss (2014) to measure repression
• We restrict our analysis to rapid and stable full democratizations. To define a democratization event,
we use the Polity Scores, an index for democracy. A country experiences a democratization event if:
(1) It reaches the highest or second-highest value on the democracy index
(2) This happens after a substantial improvement in the democracy index within a short time period
(3) It has not been democratic for 10 years before and stays democratic for 5 years after the event
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“Traditional” technique: Event study
• Run regressions using observations around
democratization event
• To test our hypothesis: Include interaction term
between event-time-dummies and income
• Rich and poor countries are similar before event
• After event, repression only declines in rich countries
and slightly increases in poor countries
• Our theoretical model predicts that democratizations reduce repression only in countries with
sufficiently high income. This reduction is immediate and persistent.
• Both traditional and modern econometric techniques provide evidence for this hypothesis
• This indicates that promoting democracy may, in some contexts, be detrimental to human rights
“Modern” technique (Xu 2017):
Generalized synthetic control group
• Divide sample in control and treatment group
• Construct “synthetic” (averaged) control group similar to treatment group until the democratization
• The difference between treatment and control group after the event is the effect estimate
• After event, repression relative to the control group declines in rich countries and does not change
in poorer countries








The maps suggest a moderate relationship between the level of democracy and repression in 2013.
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